Is Empathy Gendered and If So, Why? An Approach From Feminist Psychological Anthropology by Strauss, Claudia
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
Pitzer Faculty Publications and Research Pitzer Faculty Scholarship
12-1-2004
Is Empathy Gendered and If So, Why? An
Approach From Feminist Psychological
Anthropology
Claudia Strauss
Pitzer College
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Pitzer Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Pitzer Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
STRAUSS, C. (2004), Is Empathy Gendered and, If So, Why? An Approach from Feminist Psychological Anthropology. Ethos, 32:
432–457. doi: 10.1525/eth.2004.32.4.432
Is Empathy Gendered and, If So,
Why? An Approach from Feminist
Psychological Anthropology
CLAUDIA STRAUSS
ABSTRACT Difference feminists have argued that women have
special virtues. One such virtue would seem to be empathy,
which has three main components: imaginative projection,
awareness of the other’s emotions, and concern. Empathy is
closely related to identification. Psychological research and the
author’s own study of women’s and men’s talk about poverty
and welfare use in the United States demonstrate women’s
greater empathic concern. However, some cross-cultural re-
search shows greater sex differences in empathy in the United
States than elsewhere. This combination of findings (women
tend to demonstrate greater empathic concern, but this typical
difference varies cross-culturally) requires a complex biocul-
tural explanation, drawing on cognitive, psychoanalytic, and
feminist theories. Explanation, and not just description, is a pre-
requisite for change. [empathy, sex differences, difference femi-
nism, poverty, welfare, U.S. culture]
We are the most industrialized country in the world. We have the most money in the
world. It’s a sin to have people across from the White House that are homeless, people
that are dying because they didn’t have medical coverage. Stop building weapons so
much—this might come back to haunt me some day [laughs] but I just don’t understand,
I don’t understand why we can’t provide more for our people. The world has problems.
There are all these things that should be fixed and I just don’t understand, the nation
that we are that we can’t provide for our people. It just doesn’t make sense to me.
—Mathew Healey
And I think there are homeless people who are people who had jobs and lost them and
lost houses and would like to go to work again. And then they become embittered and
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angry. I’d be embittered and angry if I was living on the street. I think about myself
taking showers twice a day . . . In the summertime I get hot. You know? I take showers
twice a day. What if I couldn’t wash my hair, I don’t know what I’d do. You know, these
little things that you take so for granted stop being, stop being real.
—Linda Fuller
The above quotes were taken from interviews I conducted in1995 on the subject of poverty and welfare. Mathew Healeyand Linda Fuller (both pseudonyms) each evinced consid-erable concern about homelessness in the excerpts I havequoted. However, the ways in which they expressed their con-
cern differed. Mathew’s concern is put in general and abstract terms: It
is a sin to have people suffering from want in a country this wealthy.
Linda Fuller, by contrast, imagines herself in the position of someone
who is homeless, focusing in particular on some of the feelings such
a person might have. This is an example of empathic thinking, and
it seems to be more characteristic of women than men in the United
States.
This article summarizes the large number of psychological studies
of sex differences in empathy, then presents my work, drawing on open-
ended talk, on this topic. Unfortunately, not enough research has been
done cross-culturally on sex differences in empathy; what little I could
find on this topic will be discussed, as well. By and large, the cross-cultural
studies show the same sex differences as in the United States but with in-
triguing variation in the extent of difference. Finally, I consider how to
explain these findings. The large body of research on this topic convinces
me that there is a tendency for women to show greater empathic con-
cern than men. The question is why. In the last section of the article, I
review a variety of theories (including evolutionary psychology, feminist
object relations, practice theory drawing on neoassociationist learning
psychology, childhood patterns of peer interaction, and adult differences
in power) that could explain the phenomenon.
We have a tendency in anthropology either to talk vaguely of gen-
der construction without explaining what that means or to depend on
one favored psychological theory. The relation of gender, culture, and
empathy calls for both more specificity about gender construction and
greater openness to a variety of possible explanations, each of which may
have part of the truth. This is particularly important as we consider the
claims of difference feminists, who have argued that women have spe-
cial virtues not typically found in men. Difference feminists may be right
in the case of empathic concern, but a much more nuanced explana-
tion that combines biology, psychology, and culture is needed to explain
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this typical difference than feminists or cultural anthropologists usually
provide.
EMPATHY AND FEMINIST ETHICS
Empathy comes in different flavors. Psychologists have particularly
distinguished cognitive from affective components of empathy. The
cognitive aspect of empathy is awareness of another person’s feelings; the
affective aspect is an emotional reaction to another’s feelings, in partic-
ular, “an affective response more appropriate to [their] situation than to
one’s own” (Hoffman 1993:648). Although awareness of another person’s
feelings is a necessary prerequisite for a sympathetic affective response, it
is not sufficient. One could be very good at figuring out others’ feelings for
the sake of manipulating them. Thus, my focus here is on empathy as en-
compassing both a cognitive and affective aspect. I would define empathy
as a sympathetic affective response, based on awareness or imaginative re-
construction of another’s feelings. When I say a “sympathetic affective re-
sponse” I mean sympathy as a blend of its meanings of commiseration and
fellow feeling (Oxford English Dictionary [OED] Online 2003:3b and c). In
other words, this is a feeling that is in concordance with another’s feelings
without necessarily duplicating them, one that is compassionate regarding
others’ misfortune but not restricted to pity because one can sympathet-
ically share in another’s pleasure as well as pain, and pity could be taken
as condescension if the other does not wish to be pitied (Koehn 1998:57).
This definition is meant to rule out the kind of emotional response that
psychologists have called personal distress, which is a feeling of personal
discomfort caused by another’s distress (Batson et al. 1987; Davis
1996:106).
In current American English usage, it is common to confuse sympa-
thy and empathy. From the definitions of sympathy and empathy in the
OED, it appears that sympathy captures more of the affective component
of a feeling shared with or affected by or favorable to another, whereas em-
pathy, which OED defines as “The power of projecting one’s personality
into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation,” originally
had a larger cognitive component; indeed, it was first used to discuss art
appreciation. In Japan, as Takie Lebra has pointed out, empathy (omoi-
yari) can include identification with and anticipation of the desires of a
status superior, which is quite different from the prototype U.S. scenario of
empathy for someone less well off than oneself (Lebra 1976; and personal
communication, January 2004). The term empathic concern has been
adopted for the particular form of empathy consisting of “feelings of sym-
pathy and compassion for unfortunate others” (Davis 1996:57). Empathic
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concern, of course, is particularly appropriate for feelings about persons
in poverty, the topic of my research.
Empirical research has strongly linked empathy (both as a tempo-
rary state and long-term trait) to altruistic behavior (Eisenberg and Miller
1987). Empathy gives a basis for moral action based not on how you would
like to be treated (as with the Golden Rule), but how the other would.
However, some moral philosophers have criticized empathy as a source
of moral action. Although Martin Hoffman sees empathy as the basis of
morality, he does note that empathy is likely to be stronger toward people
who are known or seem similar to oneself than toward people who are less
well-known and seem different. Furthermore, empathic concern is more
likely to be aroused by someone who is present or who is currently dis-
tressed than someone who is absent or whose situation is likely to lead to
distress in the future but is not distressed at present (Hoffman 1993:667).
If one shares another person’s feelings, “one is likely to be carried along by
one’s sympathy and drawn into the other’s projects regardless of the wis-
dom of doing so,” which “preempts moral reflection” (Meyers 1994:32).
Thus, the following analysis does not assume that if women tend to be more
empathic than men, that they are necessarily more moral than men. In
particular, the kinds of antipoverty policies favored by my interviewees
were better predicted by their class than their sex.
One does not have to be a feminist to highlight the moral impor-
tance of empathy or sympathy. According to Hoffman, David Hume (1957)
and Adam Smith (1948), among other Enlightenment philosophers, made
sympathy the basis of social life. In recent years, however, it has been
feminists who have particularly elaborated moral theories that center on
empathy, often in contrast to a less-affective “justice” orientation, that is,
moral principles based on impartial rules of fairness.
A major source for feminist ethics has been the conclusion of Carol
Gilligan, drawn from interviews with mostly middle- and upper-middle-
class U.S. men and women at different ages, that women’s moral reason-
ing is more likely than men’s to employ an “ethic of care,” the core of
which is “not to turn away from someone in need” (Gilligan and Attanucci
1988:73), rather than impersonal justice, the core of which is “not to treat
others unfairly” (1988:73). Gilligan approvingly cites research that shows,
“the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater
extent to which women’s judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and
compassion” (Gilligan 1982:69). Gilligan is careful to say that the associ-
ation of different moral voices with each sex “is not absolute . . . [and not
intended to] represent a generalization about either sex. . . . No claims are
made about the origins of the differences described or their distribution
in a wider population, across cultures, or through time” (1982:2; see also
Gilligan 1993). However, quotes like the first one of Gilligan’s above and
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the whole weight of her analysis is intended to show that women (at least,
U.S. women) are more likely than men to develop an ethic of care.
Gilligan’s work, along with that of such feminists as Sara Ruddick
(1989), Nel Noddings (1984), and Diana Tietjens Meyers (1994; who draws
on the psychoanalytic work of Jessica Benjamin, Nancy Chodorow, Julia
Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray), are often cited as examples of difference
feminism. This is a term with two common meanings: It can refer to
theories that emphasize differences among women or theories of women
as essentially or at least typically different from men in ways that show
women to advantage. The latter sense is the one I am using here. As Nancy
Chodorow notes,
In contrast to the beginning of the contemporary women’s movement, there is now
a widespread view that gender differences are essential, that women are fundamen-
tally different from men, and that these differences must be recognized, theorized, and
maintained. This finds some political counterpart in notions that women’s special nature
guarantees the emergence of a good society after the feminist revolution and legitimates
female dominance, if not an exclusively female society. [Chodorow 1997:9]
Among feminists, difference feminism is highly controversial.
Chodorow (1997) rejects it (even though her research influenced
Gilligan, Meyers, and other difference feminists; see also criticisms by
Scheper-Hughes 1992 and Stack 1990), and the first website Google re-
turned when I searched difference feminism, ButterfliesandWheels.com,
scathingly remarked:
We thought we had escaped the tyranny of low expectations for women, we thought
we had crashed that prison and freed ourselves to be as tough and hard-headed and
autonomous and wide-ranging as men—and now here come the beaming Ed School
professors to tell us No, no, that’s all wrong, that’s the male way of doing things. We are
women and we have to park our brains at the door and be nice and warm and caring
and empathic and fuzzy. That’s the sort of thing that makes a self-respecting feminist
want to be as opinionated and cold and uncompromising and downright ruthless as she
can find it in her to be (Benson 2003).
What does the research show?
SEX DIFFERENCES IN EMPATHY IN THE UNITED STATES
Psychological Studies
There is insufficient space here to do justice to the great volume
of psychological studies on sex differences in empathy. A more detailed
discussion is available from the author. Overall, despite the stereotype
of “women’s intuition,” women are not consistently better at detecting
others’ thoughts and feelings (cognitive empathy). However, it does seem
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clear that among Euro-Americans, at least, women are more likely than
men to show empathic concern.
Regarding cognitive empathy, the evidence for sex differences is
mixed. On the one hand, Hall (1984) notes that women and girls are
generally better at determining the emotion depicted in pictures or
videos without verbal cues (Graham and Ickes 1997 and Eisenberg and
Lennon 1983). On the other hand, sex differences seem to be contin-
gent on details of the experimental situation: for example, giving feed-
back and monetary incentives reduces sex differences to statistical non-
significance (Klein and Hodges 2001). Snodgrass (1992; see also 1985)
found that a subject’s role in a simulated boss–employee interaction was
more important than their sex in accounting for their accuracy in de-
scribing the participants’ feelings during the interaction: “employees”
were more sensitive to how the “boss” felt about them, whereas “bosses”
were more accurate at detecting how the “employee” felt about her- or
himself.
When we turn to measures of the affective component of empathy
and empathic concern, in particular, a different picture emerges (Hoffman
1977). The largest number of such studies are self-report questionnaires
such as Mehrabian and Epstein’s Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Em-
pathy (questions such as, “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s
problems”; Eisenberg and Lennon 1983:115) and Davis’s Interpersonal
Reactivity Index, especially the Empathic Concern scale (questions like,
“I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than
me” and “When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of
protective towards them”; Davis 1983). All 22 studies of the latter sort
reviewed by Eisenberg and Lennon (1983), drawing on subjects from first
grade through adults, showed stronger female empathy. In 20 of these
studies, the differences were highly significant: “Especially for adults, the
sex differences were frequently so large that they were significant at higher
than the p < .000000001 level” (Eisenberg and Lennon 1983:116; see also
Lennon and Eisenberg 1987 and Davis 1996).
Perhaps such self-reports on questionnaires primarily measure sex
differences in self-presentation (Batson et al. 1987; Eisenberg and Lennon
1983). Still, differences in how one wants to be seen could affect one’s be-
havior. Some evidence that behavioral differences can be observed comes
from studies in which teachers and peers give higher empathy ratings
to girls than boys, but, as Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) note, those rat-
ings could be influenced by gender stereotypes, as well. More persuasive
is Lennon and Eisenberg’s review of several studies finding that women
were more likely than men (all studies but one involved adults) to report
feelings of concern in response to audiotapes, videotapes, or simulated sit-
uations of distress such as seeing another shocked (Lennon and Eisenberg
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1987:201). More recently, Eisenberg et al. (1991) found that not only did
women report more feelings than men of sympathy on watching video-
tapes designed to elicit that feeling but they also had a greater increase
in skin conductance while watching the videos. Furthermore, in a review
that looked at the relation between different measures of empathy and al-
truistic behavior, Eisenberg and Miller have found that empathy scores on
self-report measures tend to correlate positively with prosocial behaviors
such as volunteering to assist others and time spent helping callers to a
crisis hotline (Eisenberg and Miller 1987:300–301).
Related evidence comes from Gilligan and Attanucci’s (1988) re-
search on the moral orientations of U.S. males and females (in one study,
private high school students; in a second study, upper-middle-class ado-
lescents and adults; and in a third study, first-year medical students).
Participants were asked to discuss “a situation of moral conflict where
you have had to make a decision but weren’t sure what was the right thing
to do” (p. 78). Nearly equal proportions of female (35 percent) and male
(33 percent) participants balanced justice and care considerations in their
discussions—a moral approach that Gilligan and Attanucci imply is ideal.
However, virtually all of the remaining male participants (65 percent of
the total) invoked justice considerations primarily; only one man invoked
care considerations primarily. The remaining women were more evenly
divided, with 35 percent invoking care considerations primarily and
29 percent invoking justice considerations primarily. Although empathy
(“a sympathetic affective response, based on awareness or imaginative-
ness reconstruction of another’s feelings”) is not exactly the same as a
care ethic in moral dilemmas (i.e., one that focuses on interpersonal relat-
edness and concern for particular others’ needs), they are clearly related
(Hoffman 1993:676).
One odd aspect of Gilligan and Attanucci’s study of medical students
concerns the effect of ethnicity. The ethnic minority first-year medical
students who participated (about half of the total sample were African
American, Latino, or Asian American) were significantly more likely than
the Euro-American students to have a justice focus in their discussion.
This contrasts with Carol Stack’s finding that both the male and female
African Americans she studied (return migrants to the South from north-
eastern cities) tended to show a pattern of responses to moral dilemmas
that was similar to that of Gilligan’s female interviewees (Stack 1990:23;
see also Lamont 2000).1 Gilligan and Attanucci comment on their first-
year medical student finding, “The focus on justice by minority students
is of particular interest since it counters the suggestion that a care orien-
tation is the perspective of subordinates or people of lower social power
and status” (p. 83). Possibly the explanation lies in the mix of ethnicities
participating in Gilligan and Attanucci’s study, or possibly the effect of
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being first-year medical students. Gilligan and Attanucci found that the
whole sample of first-year medical students was much more likely to use
a justice orientation in discussing their moral dilemmas than were their
other two samples and there were also a very large number of medical
students who could not or would not describe a situation of moral un-
certainty. They speculate that first-year medical students are reluctant
to admit to uncertainty and perceive that an unemotional justice orienta-
tion is appropriate to their new role. Possibly the ethnic minority students
felt even more pressure than Euro-American students to employ a justice
orientation in that situation.
Gilligan and Attanucci’s research—on moral orientations, rather than
empathy per se—is the only study by psychologists based on open-ended
conversation. What does empathy look like in less-structured talk? And
does the same pattern of sex differences in empathic concern hold up with
this kind of data?
Empathy in Talk about the Poor
In 1995 I interviewed 17 men and women in two U.S. states (Rhode
Island and North Carolina) for their opinions about the U.S. welfare sys-
tem, which at the time was a topic much in the news as the U.S. Congress
and President Clinton considered sweeping cutbacks in the federal an-
tipoverty program. Several years later, asked to write something about
feminist psychological anthropology for the conference that led to this
set of articles, I looked over my interview transcripts to see whether the
sex of the speaker made a difference in the way they talked about poor
people. To my great surprise, it did. Although my female and male inter-
viewees were alike in expressing a mixture of condemnation of welfare
recipients and concern for poor people, the way in which they expressed
their views differed. For the women, sympathy seemed to be based on
imagining themselves in the place of a welfare recipient and reconstruct-
ing the feelings of someone in that situation. The men were much less
likely to do that or to identify in any way with people in poverty.
To check on my impression of a sex difference, I first culled from
each interviewee’s transcript the passage in which I judged them to have
expressed the most concern for people on welfare or in poverty. Although
several interviewees made disparaging comments about welfare recipi-
ents, everyone, at some point, expressed some concern for people in that
situation. I focused on these passages because I was particularly inter-
ested in whether there was a difference in the way men and women ex-
pressed any concern they felt and because it was not practical to obtain
ratings of the complete transcripts, which ran to an average of approx-
imately 15 pages per interviewee for the first interview alone. To rule
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out a possible bias because of my knowledge of the interviewees and the
topic of this study, I asked three women and three men to rate each of
these passages on a one-to-five scale for one of three aspects of empathy:
imaginative projection (“Does the speaker seem to be imagining what it
would be like to be in the position of someone who is poor or on wel-
fare or considering welfare? Is it as if they were looking at the issue from
the perspective of such a person?”),2 awareness of the other’s emotions
(“Does the speaker seem to be aware of the feelings of someone who is
poor or is on welfare or considering welfare? This means not just un-
derstanding about the situation, but cognizant of the emotions someone
would feel”), and concern (“How concerned would you say the speaker
was about the situation of someone who is poor or is on welfare or consid-
ering welfare?”). Raters were not told this was a study of sex differences
and interview excerpts were not accompanied by any information about
the speaker.3 Most of the raters did not report this to be a difficult task;
the one exception was a man who was not sure how to rate awareness
of the other’s emotions if the topic of the passage had nothing to do with
emotions.
The average scores of the raters revealed definite sex differences. In
each of these three aspects of empathy (imaginative projection, aware-
ness of the other’s emotions, and concern; see Table 1) the passages spo-
ken by women had a higher average rating than the passages spoken by
men. Even with the small sample, the difference was large enough in
the first two categories to be significant or near-significant (one-tailed
t test, p < .05 for imaginative projection and p < .06 for awareness of
emotions).
Table 1. Average Ratings of Components of Empathy in Talk About the Poor
Imaginative
Projection Awareness of Emotions Concern
Women’s passages (N = 10) 4.1 3.7 4.2
Men’s passages (N = 7) 3.3 2.9 3.9
Looking at imaginative projection, in particular, reveals a qualita-
tive as well as quantitative difference between my male and female inter-
viewees: there was a typical sex difference in how and why they imag-
ined themselves in another’s position. In two cases in which my male
interviewees took the perspective of someone who was poor, they did
so only to try to comprehend behavior that was hard for them to un-
derstand. In other words, they showed the first component of empathy
(imaginative projection) without the other two (awareness of emotions or
concern):
Is Empathy Gendered? ● 441
Claudia Strauss: Why do most people go on welfare, do you think?
Peter Vieira (discount
store middle manager):
I don’t know. I was thinking about that the other day. Said,
“God forbid if I ever had to be on welfare.” What would I do?
Well, let’s say that, you know, you’ve got a one-income family,
not making enough money to survive, and they’re way below
the poverty level. Should they get welfare? Okay, she’s at
home with the child. Grant you, is there any other thing that
you can do for them as opposed to doing welfare? [Continues
in this vein. No further imaginative projection.]
CS: Why do most people go on welfare, do you think? Or do
you think you can’t generalize from your two stories [about
people he knew who had been on welfare]?
Mathew Healey
(graduate student):
I hate to generalize because then you leave yourself wide
open for attack. Why do people go on welfare? Take myself,
why would I go on welfare? Um, it would be if I could not
support myself, if I was at ends, I would have to be at ends
[inaudible]. I mean, let’s look at it honestly, although my
parents wouldn’t like it, but if I was older and I had a family—
although before I would go on welfare I’m sure they would ask
me to live with them. Which would alleviate a rental issue
[deletion]. Perhaps because people don’t have that family to
fall back on, they go on welfare because they just can’t make
ends meet. If you are a single parent, that’s an issue. There
are just tons of variables.
Notice in the first example that as soon as Peter Vieira poses the question
“What would I do?” he’s back in the third person (“you’ve got a one-
income family, not making enough money to survive, and they’re way be-
low the poverty level. Should they get welfare?”). Mathew Healey sustains
the exercise longer, finally reaching understanding and a little sympathy
(average concern rating of 3), although not identification or emotional
attunement.
This contrasts with the pattern, much more common for the women,
in which taking the other’s perspective leads to attention to their feelings
and sympathetic concern:
Melissa Burton
(housewife married to
unskilled laborer):
[CS had asked if single adults who can’t find a job should
get welfare] I think that it does get depressing. You get dis-
couraged, and you want to stop. I know, you know. [deletion]
I’ve gotten laid off a couple different times. So it’s hard to go
back out there and look. And it does get discouraging.
Linda Fuller (free-lance
business writer):
And I think there are homeless people who are people who
had jobs and lost them and lost houses and would like to
go to work again. And then they become embittered and
angry. I’d be embittered and angry if I was living on the street.
I think about myself taking showers twice a day. . . . In the
summertime I get hot. You know? I take showers twice a
day. What if I couldn’t wash my hair, I don’t know what I’d
do. You know, these little things that you take so for granted
stop being, stop being real.
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Louise Sheridan
(occupational
therapist):
And I think that there’s a lot of blame towards the poor for
being poor. Like, ‘Well, you had something to do with it.’ ‘If
you had just pulled yourself up, you know, by your bootstraps
and . . . ’
Interviewer4: You say that kind of ironically.
LS: Well, well, I just see it as just a really hard thing to do. I
mean, I try to put myself into, in other people’s place and
I just don’t know, you know, living in a place that was a,
not a home—say living in a welfare hotel. That would be an
environment you wouldn’t want, wouldn’t be pleasant to be
in anyway. Then you’re supposed to have a great desire to,
you know, go out and better yourself and I just don’t see that
it’s possible in such kind of dreary surroundings.
Kathy Costa (nurse): I think women on welfare are scared. Of course, they are
scared. [CS: Scared of what?] Well, not having medical for
their children. Suppose they get sick one week and don’t
go to work, they’re not going to eat at all. You know what
I mean? You weigh that against the security of a check, no
matter how small it is, and then there is the daycare issue.
Esther Black
(secretarial-clerical
temp):
When you go to interview and the people don’t hire you,
you [inaudible] confidence down. You get depressed. Some
people are not strong, like other people. Where some people
let it affect them to the point that they are so depressed, that
they can’t even get themselves back on track.
To confirm my sense that women were much more likely to com-
bine imaginative projection with awareness of the other’s emotions and
concern, I looked at which passages received ratings above 3.5 on the
5-point scale in all three components of empathy. Six of the ten (60 per-
cent) women’s passages did, but only one of the seven (14 percent) men’s
passages did.
It is important to point out that this sample was not selected to test
sex differences in empathy for people in poverty and has a serious flaw
when used for that purpose: Three of the ten women in this sample (in-
cluding Esther Black and Kathy Costa, quoted above) had been on welfare
themselves previously, compared to only one of the seven men. For these
three women, it required very little effort to imagine the feelings of some-
one in that position. The one man who had received General Assistance
after he lost his job and became homeless, Mason Carter, now a store-
front minister, showed considerably more empathy than any of the other
men; his passage was the only one to receive high ratings on all three
components of empathy:
I interviewed some people a few years ago, because I said to myself, “How could a person
be a lawyer or a doctor and now he’s out on the streets?” Said, “Lord, how could that
happen?” I was asking questions, how could a person so high then drop so low, and I
interviewed some people. And I was talking to a person that was a doctor at one time
and I was talking to a person that was a lawyer one time, out in the street, homeless.
And it just something that happened in their life. One testimony that I heard, one of
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his children died, and he couldn’t handle it, his wife left him. Just tragic things that
happened in their lives and they never got over it. It’s hard for a mother to get over her
son getting killed, especially if he’s seven or eight years old, somebody run over him or
somebody shoot him. Sometimes it’s hard to get over that. And sometimes it just takes
time for them to get healed. Because I remember one time in my life that I was so broken
hearted for five years, I was just so broken hearted that I used to cry every night. It took
me five years to really get healed, it was a process. It didn’t happen overnight. There’s
no overnight remedies.
Mason Carter was also the only man in my sample who was not Euro-
American (he is African American).5 This is interesting in light of Stack’s
research, described above, which found her African American intervie-
wees tended to respond to moral dilemmas in a manner similar to Gilli-
gan’s female interviewees. However, I should note that Carter commented
that before he experienced homelessness himself, he had not had much
sympathy for people in that position:
I used to pass by people, homeless people, before I got sick, and I used to look and say,
“Why don’t these people get up and do this? Why don’t these people get up and do that?”
Still, even if we omit the three women who had firsthand experience of
welfare, that leaves three more who showed considerable empathy despite
the lack of firsthand experience. Some of them knew others who had been
on welfare but so did some of the men. For example, Greg Lloyd’s sister
had been on welfare but he was not particularly sympathetic to welfare
recipients, and I only learned about his sister through a passing comment
he made in the second interview. By contrast, Melissa Burton’s sister-in-
law had been on welfare, a fact that Melissa mentioned often in the first
interview as making her much more sympathetic to others in that position.
It was especially interesting that some of the women looked for ways
to identify with people in poverty or on welfare whereas, except for Mason
Carter, even when the men were sympathetic, they described no points
of similarity between themselves and the people they were discussing. (If
I were to repeat my study, I would consider identification as a possible
fourth component of empathy.) Here are some examples of ways in which
women at different socioeconomic levels found points of similarity. None
of these three had been on welfare:
Melissa Burton
(low income)
[CS had asked what changes are needed in the welfare system.
Melissa said she liked the idea of making welfare recipients work.
But she went on to excuse them for not working.] I think that once
you’re in a situation it’s hard to get out of. I mean, like anything
else. Like here, you know, we’re living here and it’s nice. But we
had said, “Oh we’ll be here for a couple years and then we’re going
to move on, hopefully gonna buy a house.”
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Well, we’re not any further, we don’t even have the money to move
right now. You know, never mind buying a house. You know, so
I think that the people that are even in projects are, it gets even
deeper. You know, you just get stuck in a hole and you just can’t get
out.
Nancy Goodall
(middle
income):
I own my own business. And although I have health insurance that I
pay for myself, I feel that if anything catastrophic happened I could
rapidly drop down into the poverty level and lose everything I have.
So, I see welfare as more of an economic question that I think should
be addressed by a lot more people than are portrayed. I feel a lot of
times the media portrays it as a “them” where I feel that a lot more
people are, I don’t know a lot of people who have huge amounts of
savings put aside in case something catastrophic happened.
Linda Fuller
(formerly high-,
now upper-
middle income):
I wonder how it is for kids who come from one-parent families
and whose mothers then have to go off to work, and I mean that’s
something that even I’ve struggled with. I lost my husband a few
years ago, and I always thought there would be time for babies,
and now I’m alone, and I’ve thought about adopting a baby, but I’m
getting old, and I have to work, and, any, you know, what, I’m not
even thinking about the finances. I am wondering how I manage
this. You know, I don’t have my family here. My family is in the
Midwest. [deletion] If you don’t have money and have to go to work
and are dependent on public funding, then what do you do? Are
you not supposed to have children? I mean, that doesn’t seem fair.
Although this research has the disadvantage of not balancing gender
and welfare experience, it has the advantage, compared to several of
the psychological studies described above, of not being susceptible to
experimenter-demand characteristics. In contrast to the questionnaire-
based studies of empathy reported above, my interviewees had no reason
to think they were taking part in a study on empathy and so could not
have been influenced by the stereotype that women are supposed to be
more empathic. The only possible problem could have been the presence
of a female interviewer. (I conducted all of the interviews except one, and
that one was conducted by a female graduate student.) Possibly my pres-
ence triggered a certain style of emotion talk for my female interviewees,
who might have responded differently to a male interviewer. I return to
this possibility below in the discussion of theories that might explain the
relation of gender, culture, and empathy.
Another limitation of my study, and of almost all of the research
discussed so far, is that it is confined to U.S. men and women. Is empathy
gendered the same way elsewhere?
CROSS-CULTURAL SEX DIFFERENCES IN EMPATHY
Pasternak, Ember, and Ember’s review of cross-cultural studies of
psychological differences between men and women claims,
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Some theorists suggest that women are more apt to be concerned with interpersonal
relationships, and to have more empathy for the feelings of others. To date, studies
outside the United States, in Israel and some Asian countries, provide considerable
support for this expectation. [1997:64]
Unfortunately, they cite just one study (Stimpson et al. 1992) in support
of this conclusion, and it is one, discussed further below, that uses only
an indirect measure of empathy. My (admittedly unsystematic) review
of the cross-cultural literature has turned up only a little research on the
topic. What has been done generally confirms the pattern of greater female
empathy, although with intriguing cross-cultural variation in the extent
of sex differences.
Eisenberg and Lennon’s (1983) review and meta-analysis of several
dozen psychological studies regarding sex differences in empathy includes
six, employing a variety of measures, with non-U.S. subjects. Their sum-
mary tables show that five of the six report a female advantage (three
statistically significant); the sixth does not indicate which sex was higher
in empathy (Eisenberg and Lennon 1983:109, 116, 121–123). Hall’s re-
views of a large number of studies have found females better than males
at identifying emotions, except anger, on the basis of nonverbal cues (e.g.,
pictures), across cultures (Brody and Hall 2000:344). Finnish (Myyry and
Helkama 2001:35), Israeli (Karniol et al. 1998), and South Asian Indian
(Bhandari and Parthi 2000:274–275) female students scored higher than
male students in these countries on empathy as measured by self-report
questionnaires.
Kashima and several colleagues (1995) note that there are separate re-
search traditions attributing “sociocentric” or “communal” self-concepts
to non-Westerners and to women (see Markus and Oyserman 1989) and
wondered whether women’s self-concepts are other-oriented in the same
way as non-Westerners’. They found clear differences. Their Japanese and
Korean samples were much more collectivist in putting group interest over
individual interest than their Australian and mainland U.S. samples (i.e.,
more likely to agree with statements like, “I am prepared to do things for
my group at any time, even though I have to sacrifice my own interest”);
sex differences in collectivism were small and nonsignificant. However,
sex differences clearly emerged in kanjin-shugi (“between-people-ism”
or “emotional relatedness”). The items they list include clear self-report
indicators of empathy (highest loaded item: “I feel like doing something for
people in trouble because I can almost feel their pains”). In all five of their
university student samples (Australia, mainland United States, Hawaii,
Japan, and Korea), females were higher in kanjin-shugi than males, with
the gender difference significant at the p < .05 level in Australia, mainland
United States, and Japan.
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Table 2. Emotional Relatedness (Kanjin-shugi) Means (adapted from
Kashima et al. 1995, Table 3, p. 930)
United States Australia Hawaii Japan Korea
Female .41 .26 .18 −.23 .20
Male −.27 −.21 −.03 −.59 .17
If I were to say no more, it would seem that culture has little influence
on empathy; women are always and everywhere more empathic than men.
However, Kashima et al. also found statistically significant cultural differ-
ences in kanjin-shugi, which become obvious from the means reported in
Table 2.
From this table, it is clear why it is U.S. researchers who have been
obsessed with sex differences in empathy: There is a stark gender polarity
in U.S. men and women’s responses to questions about emotional connect-
edness. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of the Australian sample. By
contrast, although Japanese men and women differ from each other signif-
icantly in this measure, neither men nor women feel comfortable affirming
relatedness (contrary to the researchers’ prediction) and the difference
between the Korean men and women is negligible. (As Kashima et al. hy-
pothesized, on almost every scale, the Hawaiian students fell in between
the U.S. and Australian samples, on the one side, and the Japanese and
Korean samples, on the other side.) I would dismiss the Korean findings as
perhaps the result of poor translation or some other confounding factor if
it were not for the fact that a cross-cultural study by Stimpson et al. (1992)
found that female university students gave significantly higher evaluations
than males of such traits as being understanding, sensitive to the needs
of others, sympathetic, compassionate, tender, and eager to soothe hurt
feelings in China, Thailand, the United States—but not Korea, where the
predicted sex differences were found, but were small.6 Stimpson et al.
explain the Korean exception in terms of peculiarities of their Korean
university student sample, but Kashima et al. think their Korean student
sample reflects a larger cultural tendency to “place importance on the
mutual understanding of true sentiments and feelings” (Kashima et al.
1995:934).7
In sum, the cross-cultural research on empathy confirms the picture
of greater female empathy, particularly, greater female self-descriptions
of empathy, but the extent of the sex difference varies considerably. What
theories of the relation of culture, psychology, and gender would explain
this?
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THEORIES OF GENDER, CULTURE, AND EMPATHY
The simplest explanation of gender differences in empathy is that
they reflect nothing more than differences in men’s and women’s dis-
course practices. Women and men do not have different ways of think-
ing and feeling, necessarily, just different conventions in their discourse
communities. This could explain the sex difference I observed in my in-
terviewees’ comments as well as responses to self-report questionnaires.
Just as U.S. men typically do not use color terms like “mauve” (Lakoff
1975), they also typically do not respond positively to words like “ten-
der” on questionnaires. This could be called a shallow explanation of the
gender differences reported here, in the sense that it does not require
much explanation of psychological processes. This shallow explanation,
although it could be part of the truth, does not explain why Eisenberg
et al. (1991) also found a difference in men’s and women’s skin conduc-
tance when watching sympathy or fear-inducing videos. Also, are dis-
course practices gendered the same way cross-culturally, for example,
in northern India and Finland, where a sex difference in responses to
self-report questionnaires was also found? Finally, if true, these norms
of speaking in turn require explanation. Why are empathic discourses
gendered?
The same issues arise if the explanation is offered, as several psychol-
ogists have done (e.g., Davis 1996:60), that empathy is more important
in women’s identities than men’s. This would be consistent with the sym-
bolic interactionist explanation that self-concepts are the result of others’
expectations. If women are expected to be more empathic, they acquire
this self-concept, and as I noted above, self-concept can affect behavior.
Still, we would want to know whether women are expected to be more
empathic in all the societies in which sex differences have been observed.
And why should this expectation arise?
A more complete possible explanation comes from feminist object re-
lations theory, a psychoanalytic approach. As Nancy Chodorow explored,
influentially, in The Reproduction of Mothering (1999), there are impor-
tant psychological consequences of the fact that mothers are much more
likely than fathers to be the primary caretakers of young children. As ear-
lier theorists (e.g., Burton and Whiting 1961) have noted, as well, girls can
develop their gender identity as being like that of their primary caretaker,
whereas boys’ sense of masculinity requires negating identity with their
primary caretaker. Compounding these different gender identity issues for
boys and girls, Chodorow believes, is different treatment by their mother
because mothers experience their daughters as like them and their sons
as different from them: “Boys are more likely to have been pushed out
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of the preoedipal relationship, and to have had to curtail their primary
love and sense of empathic tie with their mother” (1999:166). According
to Chodorow, “Girls emerge from this [preoedipal] period with a basis for
‘empathy’ built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do
not. Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another’s needs
or feelings as one’s own (or of thinking that one is experiencing another’s
needs and feelings)” (1999:167).
As Jessica Benjamin (1988) developed this thesis, children’s gender
identities start forming while they are toddlers, at the same time they are
faced with the psychological conflict between their desire to explore and
assert themselves, on the one hand, and their desire to remain close and
dependent, on the other hand (the rapprochement phase or complex).
According to Benjamin, mother looms large in the toddler’s unconscious
as a symbol of closeness that is comforting but also a threat to the child’s
desire to assert him- or herself. Fathers and, by symbolic extension, mas-
culinity are associated instead with independence and power. The result
at this stage, she postulates, is that boys and girls dichotomize femaleness
and maleness, associating the former with closeness and the latter with
separation (Benjamin 1988:104). Toddlers of both sexes still have some
of their original identification with the mother, but now they take mascu-
line independence and power as an ideal with which they wish to identify
when they want to protect their agency.
Over the next few years, however, young children’s cross-sex identi-
fications are discouraged by caretakers and in popular culture represen-
tations. By the time children enter school, girls still idealize a masculine
independent self as well as a feminine nurturing self but identify with
the feminine self. For boys, however, the feminine ideal is very threat-
ening. They cannot imagine themselves becoming the one who provides
the nurturance, only the helpless baby who receives it, so they repu-
diate nurturance. This is particularly so in the context of a culture in
which “nurturance, responsiveness, and physical closeness are [not] val-
ued” because they “are associated exclusively with infancy” (Benjamin
1988:173). The result for boys is “Emotional attunement, sharing states
of mind, empathically assuming the other’s position, and imaginatively
perceiving the other’s needs and feelings—these are now associated with
cast-off femininity” (Benjamin 1988:170).
Interestingly, for my study of empathy for the poor, Benjamin be-
lieves that men’s rejection of nurturance and dependence has social pol-
icy consequences, leading to “Contempt for the needy and dependent,
emphasis on individual self-reliance, rejection of social forms of provid-
ing nurturance” (1988:171). Although Benjamin does not spell out why
men’s schemas are reflected in social policy more than women’s schemas,
this could be explained in several ways. The most straightforward and
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obvious way would be to point to the predominance of men in policy-
making positions. Benjamin would probably add two points: policy mak-
ing, as a public sphere activity, is symbolically associated with masculinity,
and for both men and women, the autonomous independent father is an
ideal.
This theory would explain why, regardless of level of sympathy with
people in poverty or socioeconomic standing, my male interviewees—
with only one exception, a man who had been homeless himself—did
not identify with someone in welfare or poverty in the sense of finding
some point of commonality between themselves and the needy other.
This was much more likely to occur with my female interviewees, again,
irrespective of their overall levels of sympathy or socioeconomic standing.
This suggests U.S. men fear admitting vulnerability. But would gender
of the primary caretaker alone explain the seeming Korean exception?
Probably not. As Benjamin notes, other factors can come into play, such
as the extent to which nurturance, responsiveness, and physical closeness
are culturally valued as well as the extent to which mothers, women, and
femininity are valued or devalued by fathers, in particular, and the public
culture, in general. These factors would have to be examined in a variety of
societies, to see whether they correspond to patterns of gender differences
in empathy.
A completely different psychological theory, cognitive learning the-
ory, was employed by Carol Ember to explain the effects of female task
assignments on Luo Kenyan boys (Ember 1973). In the community Ember
studied there were many more boys than girls. Families that had no girls
available to perform what observers agreed were such typically female
chores as fetching water, digging root crops, cleaning house, and taking
care of babies assigned them to the oldest available boy. Those boys were
observed by Ember’s assistants to have a behavioral profile in between
those of most boys and most girls in that community, showing signifi-
cantly fewer egoistic behaviors such as aggression to satisfy their own
needs and more prosocial behaviors. Interestingly, these effects did not
hold for chores these boys did that the Luo considered female but were
conducted outside the house; only for female chores performed inside
the house (with baby tending having particularly strong effects in re-
ducing aggression and dominance). Similar findings are reported by the
Whitings (based on research by the LeVines and summarized in Paster-
nak et al. 1997): In Kenya, (Nyansongo) Gusii boys, unlike boys in the
other societies described by the Whitings and their colleagues, “actu-
ally offered help and support to others more often than girls . . . they may
have been unexpectedly helpful in Nyansongo because . . . families fre-
quently called upon them to help care for young children” (Pasternak et al.
1997:60).
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Ember interprets her findings as showing that assignment of female
tasks to boys does not lead them to be then labeled as feminine and iden-
tify with all aspects of female roles or to identify with mother and take on
all aspects of her behavior. Instead, the effects are closely correlated with
what specific behaviors need to be learned in a role. For example, baby
tending requires a suppression of aggressive behaviors, but that is not nec-
essary for outdoor chores. Thus, Ember favors an associationist learning
theory explanation that “a child may acquire certain behaviors because
they are necessary to the competent performance of certain tasks. These
associated social behaviors, rewarded directly by the supervisory agents
or indirectly by the child’s sense of performing the tasks well, should gen-
eralize to other realms of behavior” (Ember 1973:427; for a more current
neoassociationist learning theory, see Strauss and Quinn 1997, esp. ch.
3). Learning theory is consistent with practice theories (e.g., Bourdieu
1977), which also give primary importance to the way schemas are em-
bodied through everyday social practices.
How would an associationist learning theory explain sex differences
in empathy? Eleanor Maccoby (1998) argues that a primary explanation
for sex differences is that from the late preschool years on, boys and girls
tend to divide into sex-segregated play groups. Furthermore, boys’ groups
tend to be larger and their play rougher than girls’ groups. This would
give the girls more practice in intimate interpersonal communication,
facilitating the development of empathy. Maccoby notes that the effects
of play are more important than parents’ explicit values and socialization:
U.S. parents, at least, tend to discourage aggressive behavior by both boys
and girls, but it still occurs with boys if they are triggered by the presence
of other boys (Maccoby 1998:292). Parental input emerges as important
in another way, however. As Maccoby explains:
[Parents] talk more about feelings with girls than with boys. Starting when the children
are toddlers, and continuing into their preschool years, parents talk more often to little
girls about how the child is feeling now, was feeling earlier, or might feel if certain things
happened. They more often discuss with daughters how a child’s actions make other
people feel. [1998:296; see also, Lennon and Eisenberg 1987:196.)
Maccoby’s explanations seem to have a promising fit to the cross-cultural
data. Munroe and Romney (n.d.) have found the pattern of larger boys’ play
groups (for boys 7–9 years old) in four disparate societies, and exceptional
cases, such as Korea, could be explained by the cultural importance of
emotional sensitivity for both boys and girls. (Studies of Japanese child
rearing, however, have been observed to stress the importance of concern
for others’ feelings, e.g., Lebra 1976, so it is puzzling that Kashima et al.
found a significant sex difference there as well as negative mean scores
for both men and women.)
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However, Maccoby’s explanation thus far is incomplete. Why are boys’
play groups larger and their play rougher than girls’? Why do (at least U.S.)
parents talk more often to girls than boys about feelings? In answer to the
question of why boys’ play groups tend toward a rough style of play, she
cites evidence for a hormonal basis:
There are striking similarities between human children and their nonhuman primate
cousins with respect to differentiated playstyles and gender segregation. . . . Some phys-
iological processes have been identified. For example, experimental studies in which an-
drogens have been administered prenatally to genetically female monkeys have changed
their postnatal playstyles: these young females engage in more rough-and-tumble play
than untreated females. . . . Perinatal androgens may also be implicated in the tendency
for males to separate themselves more strongly from adults than females typically do.
In one study, the administration of an androgen-antagonist to newborn male monkeys
delayed their move away from adults and into a male peer group. We see then a modest
bit of evidence that the asymmetry between boys’ and girls’ groups—the greater inde-
pendence and stronger boundaries of male groups—is influenced by hormones present
at or near the time of birth. [Maccoby 1998:290–291]
Regarding the second question, Maccoby speculates that parents con-
sider talking about feelings to be “too ‘soft’ in dealing with a boy,” or that
girls’ typically faster language acquisition makes it easier to discuss com-
plicated matters or “they may reflect girls’ greater willingness to listen
to, and participate in, talk about emotions” (Maccoby 1998:296). The last
explanation, of course, begs the question of why girls would have a greater
interest in talk about emotions. Here, again, there may be a physiological
basis. Recent neuropsychological research seems to indicate that women’s
brains tend to process pictures or words with strong emotional content
differently than men’s brains. The author of one such study, Turhan Canli,
concludes, “The wiring of emotional experience and the coding of that ex-
perience into memory is much more tightly integrated in women than
in men” (Recer 2002; see also Bremner et al. 2002). This would be con-
sistent with an evolutionary psychology argument that men and women
have evolved with different psychological responses because these differ-
ences were adaptive. For example, it could be argued that because women
have, historically, taken most responsibility for care of preverbal infants
and young children, they have needed to be particularly aware of and
concerned about emotion expression.
It should be remembered, however, that neurophysiological differ-
ences in adults are not necessarily innate. Human brains are highly plas-
tic. It could be that the tighter integration of emotion neural circuitry in
women than in men is the effect, rather than the cause, of greater practice
in noticing and responding to others’ emotions.
A last, completely different possibility is that the differences in men
and women’s empathy are not the result of sex differences but of typi-
cal power differences between men and women (Miller 1986). People in
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subordinate positions need to be more skilled at figuring out the thoughts
and feelings of social superiors than the reverse. Recall that Snodgrass
(1985, 1992) found that role was a better predictor than sex of the ability
to know what another person feels about you. However, this only explains
the cognitive aspect of empathy. Why should subordinates show more
empathic concern? One possibility is that knowing typically leads to car-
ing; if one has insight into another’s thoughts and feelings, one is more
likely to be sympathetic. However, most research does not show a strong
sex difference in detecting others’ thoughts and feelings, so that does not
seem to be the explanation. A more likely explanation is that women’s
economic and power disadvantages—still present in the United States as
well as the other societies discussed here—lead them to be worried that
they themselves might be in need someday, hence more sympathetic with
others in that position. Thus, with respect to my interviewees, it could be
argued that even the women who had not personally experienced welfare
or poverty would find it easier than the male interviewees to see how they
could end up in that position, hence be more concerned about people in
that situation. This is a realistic concern, given the feminization of poverty.
Similarly, perhaps women are more likely to agree with questions like, “I
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”
and “When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protec-
tive towards them” because they can imagine that they themselves will
be less fortunate or be taken advantage of.8
Most likely, several of these factors are at work. It is unlikely there
is an empathy gene. However, possibly women have a slight innate edge
in emotion processing, which, along with a tendency to more intimate
play groups, leads to greater practice in detecting and responding to oth-
ers’ emotions. Gender stereotypes could be formed as a result, which
lead to social expectations, personal identities, patterns of behavior, and
discourse practices that reinforce those sex differences. An especially sig-
nificant factor seems to be that girls are more often assigned chores that
require care for others. These factors could be accentuated in societies
like the United States in which relations of mutual independence, rather
than nurturance and dependence, are seen as ideal. The feminist psy-
choanalytic explanation then adds U.S. men’s defensive need to repudiate
sympathy for the dependent because the social division of parenting sym-
bolically equates giving nurturance with femininity. Societies in which it
is acceptable for social inferiors to be dependent on social superiors (male
or female), or in which men as well as women are encouraged to pay at-
tention to and be concerned about others’ emotions, and in which boys
are as likely as girls to take care of small children, would be more likely
to mold men and women who are equally, or almost equally, inclined to
be empathic.
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CONCLUSION
Where does this leave difference feminism? Difference feminists had
a worthy project: to reverse stereotypes of women’s inferiority. Further-
more, Gilligan and her colleagues made an important empirical discovery
of “a different voice,” the care orientation in morality, which had been
overlooked and is more likely to be used by women than men, at least
among some populations in the United States. My research reinforces
Gilligan and her colleagues’ finding of U.S. women’s typically distinctive
“voice.” There are three respects, however, in which my results diverge
from those of difference feminists like Gilligan.
First, although empathy has been shown to correlate with altruism
and other prosocial behaviors in experiments, the overall effects on be-
havior are complicated by many other factors, so I would want to be more
careful than difference feminists usually are about celebrating the sex dif-
ferences I found. As I noted at the beginning of the article, men’s and
women’s ways of talking about the poor were not a good predictor of the
antipoverty policies they favored in my study. In a related larger survey
(Strauss 2002), I found that social class and the kind of interpretive frame-
work that was salient at a given moment, rather than the respondent’s sex,
explained the extent to which, for example, they favored making health
insurance and jobs available to all Americans who need them instead of
imposing a time limit on welfare.
Second, difference feminists have conducted insufficient cross-
cultural research. The cross-cultural research I found reinforces the cri-
tique many have made (e.g., Scheper-Hughes 1992 and Stack 1990) that
difference feminism is too blunt a theory to handle intra- and intercultural
variation.
Finally, I believe we need to go beyond our all-too-common vague
talk of “gender construction” to try to explain, and not just describe, this
phenomenon. Without an explanation, we do not know how to go about
making changes. Quinn (2000) has critiqued the current trend toward
cultural particularism among contemporary feminist anthropologists. Un-
explained universalism is the complementary problem of difference fem-
inists. If feminists—whether particularists or universalists—eschew at-
tempts to acknowledge and explain widespread sex differences, the ironic
result will be the unchallenged dominance of simplistic genetic explana-
tions. We need to combat these reductionistic explanations because the
truth is much more complicated and hopeful.
CLAUDIA STRAUSS is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Pitzer College.
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1. Stack conducted two studies, one with adolescents (N = 87) and one with adults (N =
15). In the adolescent study, 43 percent of the girls and 42 percent of the boys had a justice
focus, 31 percent each of the girls and boys had a care focus, and 26 percent of the girls
and 27 percent of the boys had mixed justice and care considerations. In the adult study,
the women were more likely than the men to combine justice and care considerations (62.5
percent to 43 percent, respectively), whereas the men were somewhere more likely to have
a justice focus (43 percent to 37.5 percent), but the only subject who had a care focus was
a man (Stack 1990:23).
2. Elinor Ochs pointed out (personal communication, April 2004) that all projection is
imaginative, so it is redundant to use both terms. This is true, but I want to distinguish
empathic projection from projection as that term is used in psychoanalytic theory to de-
scribe the unconscious defense mechanism of attributing to others one’s own unconscious,
forbidden feelings.
3. The two raters familiar with my topic did not produce results different from the rest.
Data, including complete instructions for the raters and all the culled passages, are available
from the author.
4. Louise Sheridan was interviewed by my research assistant, Haven White (identified as
“Interviewer”).
5. There were two women of color in my sample: Esther Black, who is Afro-Caribbean,
and Anna Monteiro, who is a black Cape Verdean.
6. The traits were measured by a questionnaire from Bem’s Sex Role Inventory (Bem
1974), which asked subjects, “Please inspect and rate each of the following descriptors as to
its goodness or badness pertaining to social desirability as follows: 1 = a very bad trait; 2 =
a somewhat bad trait; 3 = a neutral trait; 4 = a somewhat good trait; 5 = a very good trait”
(Stimpson et al. 1992). This is only an indirect measure of Gilligan’s caring morality and of
empathy.
7. They explain the unexpectedly low Japanese kanjin-shugi scores as follows: “After the
war, the Japanese abandoned the traditional values of interpersonal obligations as they were
seen to be too closely linked with the ultranationalism of the pre-war government . . . Perhaps,
Japanese university students today deliberately and explicitly disavow the relational self”
(Kashima et al. 1995:934).
8. Heather Willihnganz (personal communication, April 2004) has proposed still another
explanation: There are greater benefits and fewer costs to women’s empathy then men’s.
This, of course, fits rational choice theories.
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